A Comparative Analysis of Direct Democracy, Two Candidate Elections, and Three Candidate Elections in an Experimental Environment by Plott, Charles R.
DIVISION OF THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
PASADENA. CALIFORNIA 91125 
A COMPARA'UVE ANALYSIS OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY, TWO CANDIDATE 
ELECTIONS, AND THREE CANDIDATE ELECTIONS 
IN AN EXPERIMENTAL ENVIRONMENT 
Charles R. Plott 
California Institute of Technology and Center for Advanced 
Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford 
Originally presented at the 
1977 meeting of the Public Choice Socie ty SOCIAL SCIENCE WORKING PAPER 457
November 1982 
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY, TWO-CANDIDATE 
ELECTIONS, AND THREE-CANDIDATE ELECTIONS 
IN AN EXPERIMENTAL ENVIRONMENT 
Charles R. Plott 
ABSTRACT 
This study explores the behavioral properties of two-candidate 
elections, three-candidate elections and large committees. The 
political processes were created under laboratory conditions that 
hold constant variables other than the decision rule. The core/ 
equilibrium of a spatial model of competition is an accurate 
predictor of outcomes but the outcome variance is higher under 
three-candidate processes than it is under the other two. A poll 
tax is also studied. 
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY, TWO CANDIDATE 
ELECTIONS, AND THREE CANDIDATE ELECTIONS 
IN AN EXPERIMENTAL ENVIRONMENT* 
Charles R. Plott 
California Institute of Technology ard 
Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford 
This study explores the behavioral properties of very 
simple political processes. The processes are two-candidate elections, 
three-candidate elections, and large committees. These alternative 
political processes are implemented under laboratory experimental 
conditions in which the issues and underlying population preferences 
over issues are held constant. Such a setting provides a method for 
checking the accuracy of spatial models of candidate competition. 
Indeed, if the models are sufficiently inaccurate in simple laboratory 
environments, then they might readily be rejected as applicable to 
much more complicated, naturally occurring systems. In addition, the 
experimental design provides a comparison of selected aspects of 
behavior of these alternative processes. The design can also be 
viewed as an extension of the experimental research reported in Fiorina 
and Plott (1978) and Plott and Levine (1978) that develops conditions 
under which the decisions that operate under majority rule can be 
accurately predicted by equilibrium models of political behavior. In 
the design reported here the conditions are relaxed by enlarging 
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considerably the size of the decisionmaking group. 
The study is divided into four sections plus concluding 
remarks. Section One outlines the research questions. The procedures 
and parameters are in Section Two. Section Three contains the 
experimental results. Section Four discusses the results of an 
auxiliary experiment designed to examine the decision to vote. 
The paper contains no extensive discussion about the problems and 
limitations of experimental methods themselves even though the 
experiments here are the first laboratory examination of election 
process and many scholars harbor legitimate reservations about 
what might be learned from such an exercise. The methodological 
issues are addressed extensively in Fiorina and Plott (1978) ,  and 
Plott (1978, 1981) , so the interested reader is referred to those 
sources. Obviously political scientists have been interested in 
processes infinitely more complicated than those studied here and 
even within the context of these simple experiments a variety of 
complicating factors, alternative procedures, or alternative parameters 
could have been imposed. Presumably, these alternatives will be 
explored as experimental technology and experience is acquired. 
SECTION ONE: RESEARCH QUESTIONS STUDIED 
The groups studied are characterized by three prominent 
features. 
a. The options available to the group are well specified and involve 
no uncertainty. This removes from consideration groups which 
traditionally have been called "problem solving" groups. 
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b. Individuals have "strong" incentives. There is no large-scale 
"indifference" among decisionmakers. 
c. There are no premeeting meetings or agreements. Thus, the 
individuals meet to decide the issues without preformed coalitions. 
When such groups operate using majority rule and a fixed 
agenda, the form of the agenda essentially determines the outcome 
(Plott and Levine 1978) . When the agenda is not fixed but is 
determined endogenously as the group uses majority rule and common 
parliamentary procedures, small group decisions can be modeled as 
a cooperative game without side payments. By treating the majority 
preference relation as a dominance relation and computing the 
associated core, one obtains an accurate prediction of the group's 
choice (Fiorina and Plott 1978) .  This study was designed to answer 
three questions which naturally emerge from such results. 
1. Does the core predict the outcome when the group (committee) is
"large"? Several lines of reasoning can lead one to a negative 
prediction. In a large group an individual feels less influential 
and is thus likely to accept poor terms more readily. Thus 
according to this argument the outcomes would be more erratic as 
the group size increases and individuals readily accept the first 
options they are offered. In addition, the potential for leadership 
influence and the related conformity tendencies of followers would 
increase the likelihood of coalition formation. A coalition, once 
formed, would not likely choose the core. 
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2. Does the group choice diverge from the equilibrium/core when the 
decision is made by means of a majority-rule two-candidate election 
process? Is there a difference between the policy-choice behavior 
of a large committee and procedures when the winner of a competitive 
election chooses the policy? Spatial models of candidate competition 
(see Riker and Ordeshook, 1973, for a summary) suggest that the 
model used above to describe the choices of small committees applies 
equally well to the choice behavior of electorates choosing between 
two candidates. Data in support of such claims are sparse and 
alternative modes of thought lead readily to different conclusions. 
If, for example, candidates put together a coalition, or if 
individuals vote for personalities rather than preference, or if 
candidates become loyal to subsets of supporters and thereby fail 
to move too far from them, etc., etc. , then the outcome will not 
be the core. 
3. What are the differences between two-candidate election processes 
and three-candidate processes? Existing models apply only to the 
two-candidate case. The intuitive reasoning which underlies the 
two-candidate models suggests that three-candidate elections will 
behave substantially differently. Candidates who adopt the core 
position can be "squeezed out" by the other two candidates. Thus 
the core position might not tend to be chosen. 
Existing models do not have an exceptionally strong base 
in the theories of individual choice and behavior. Many aspects of 
individual behavior stand as near paradoxes against the reasoning 
which lies behind the models. Existing theories are pushed hard to 
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explain why people vote (Ferejohn and Fiorina 1975) . In three-candidate 
elections, how an individual votes is as perplexing as why (s) he votes. 
Furthermore, the optimum strategy for a candidate is not obvious so 
there is sufficient theoretical latitude to support almost any result. 
The experiments provide an opportunity for us to study the behavior of 
some simple cases of these processes. 
SECTION TWO: PROCEDURES AND PARAMETERS 
Subjects were recruited from California Institute of Technology, 
Pasadena City College, Los Angeles City College, University of California, 
Cal State Los Angeles, Cal State Fullerton, and Cal State Northridge. 
Large classes were used where possible; otherwise subjects were recruited 
and paid $4 (which was promised them) plus whatever they earned during 
the experiment as dictated by their payoff chart explained below. All 
payments were made in cash immediately after the experiment. 
The procedures are essentially those reported in detail in 
Fiorina and Plott (1978) . The "issue space" was the blackboard. A 
preference for each individual was induced on the basis of the theory of 
induced preference (Smith 1976) . That is, where the blackboard was 
given a coordinate system, each individual i was assigned a function 
ui (x, y) indicating the amount of money he would receive from the 
experimenter expressed as a function of the point chosen by the group. 
Since no side payments were allowed, this function induced preferences 
i i for points on the blackboard according to (x,y)R (x',y') � u (x,y) > 
ui (x' , y') . The gradients of the functions u
i
(x, y) were generally 
between $1 and $3 per unit over relevant ranges of the blackboard. 
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A typical payoff chart is included here as figure 1. In the election 
experiment the winning candidate was paid $10 and the losing candidate 
was paid $1. 
The indifference curves of each individual were circles 
centered around his/her most preferred point. The distribution of 
most preferred points for thirty-five subject experiments is shown on 
figure 2. Because recruitment was difficult, frequently the number of 
subjects differed across experimental sessions. The formula for adding 
or subtracting subjects from the standard thirty-five person design 
shown on figure 2 is outlined on table 1. For sessions with fewer 
than thirty-five subjects, locations were removed in pairs starting 
with the locations indexed as first which are the preferences of 
individuals 32 and 33. The second pair removed was individuals 28 
and 29, etc. When more than thirty-five participants were available, 
subjects were added by giving pairs preferences in the same order as 
just described. Thus, individuals 36 and 37 had the same preferences 
as individuals 32 and 33, etc. 
The distribution of ideal points (figure 2) satisfies a 
condition of radial symmetry around the point (40, 70) for all experiments. 
For each individual there is another individual whose most pref erred 
point is on the "opposite side" of (40, 70) . This condition was shown 
by Plott (1967) to constitute a sufficient condition for (40, 70) to be 
a core/equilibrium. Notice, however, that (40, 70) is not the mean of 
the distribution of ideal points nor is the point (40,70) near the 
middle of the range of the distribution of ideal points. So, theories 
based on such properties of the distribution cannot be used as alternative 
explanations of outcomes. 
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FIGURE I. E · xom I P e Payoff Ch art
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FIGURE 2: Distribution of Individual Optimums
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TABLE 1 
REMOVAL SEQUENCE
3 
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Position Position 
in in 
Subject Maximum Removal Subject Maximum Removal 
Number Point Sequence Number Point Sequence 
1 (40, 70) 19 (147, 70) 
2 (24, 70) 8th 20 (30, 64) 3rd 
3 (85, 70) 8th 21 (65, 85) 3rd 
4 (24, 74) 22 (36, 59) 5th 
5 (182, 34) 23 (64, 136) 5th 
6 (27, 83) 7th 24 (36, 76) 9th 
7 (93, 17) 7th 25 (SO, SS) 9th 
8 (28, 49) 26 (36, 71) 12th 
9 (56, 98) 27 (68, 63) 12th 
10 (48, 43) 10th 28 (36, 66) 2nd 
11 (30, 103) 10th 29 (48, 78) 2nd 
12 (16, 58) 30 (14, 75) 6th 
13 (122' 111) 31 (56, 67) 6th 
14 (7 '63) 32 (34, 8 2) 1st 
15 (187, 100) 33 (45, 60) 1st 
16 (40, 15) 11th 34 (40, 70) 4th
1 
17 (40, 78) 11th 35 (40, 70) 4th2 
18 (30, 70) i 
1 This position is never removed in the three-candidate election. 
2 This position is always removed from all three-candidate elections. 
3 For experiment with more than thirty-five in the electorate, positions 
were added in the same order as the removal sequence. 
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After subjects were seated, volunteers were recruited for 
the position of candidate in the election experiments. The instructions 
(see the appendix) explained how to read their payoff charts and the 
procedures. In all experiments, no individual had information about 
payoffs of others and individuals were not allowed to indicate the 
amounts or make side payments even though statements about preferences 
were admissible.
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The dynamics of all three types of processes can be identified 
by a series of periods which are more precisely defined in the election 
processes. For the large committee experiments the process started 
with a motion on the floor (200, 150). This motion could be amended, 
with the amended motion becoming the new motion on the floor, until 
the question was called and a majority accepted the motion as amended. 
Each successful amendment can be viewed as a stage since the effect was 
to change the motion on the floor from one point to another. 
The election processes began with all candidates at the 
same point (200, 150). Candidates were free to change their positions 
at any time. The group choice was the position of the winning candidate 
at the time of the election. A period could be identified with the 
opportunity for a candidate to gain information about preferences by 
asking polling questions: "How many would like for me to move to 
point ? "  Such opportunities were given to candidates i n  turn 
and the answers obtained were public information. Every several minutes a 
Gallup poll was taken ("If the election were held now, how many would 
vote for ___ ? ") .  The results of these polls were public. 
SECTION THREE: EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS--OUTCOMES 
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For all experimental sessions the core is the point (40, 70). 
Ten experimental sessions were conducted for each of the three processes. 
As can be seen on figures 3 and 4 as well as table 2 the core is an 
excellent predictor for all three processes. The mean outcomes are 
(38. 3, 69. 8), (38. 8, 70. 9), and (39. 2, 70. 5) respectively for direct 
democracy, two-candidate elections, and three-candidate elections. 
Standard deviations for the committee and two-candidates are small 
and about one-third of the standard deviation of the three-candidate 
election. 
The central results are thus easy to state. The mean outcome 
from all three processes is essentially the same. On average all three 
processes tend to produce core/equilibrium outcomes. 2 The variances of 
direct democracy and two-candidate elections are approximately equal 
but the variance of the three-candidate process around this mean is 
higher than the other two. 3 
From an anecdotal or "qualitative" point of view, the large 
committees do seem to be different from small committees. The small 
groups we have observed (Fiorina and Plott 1978) are interactive. 
Large groups are not. Only a small subset seems to participate at all 
and the meetings seem to go much faster. People simply voted their 
interest without bothering to argue, compromise, or persuade others. 
This supports a conjecture that large groups will be much more 
susceptible to procedural influences such as those reported in Plott 
and Levine (1978) than are small groups. 
The experimental outcomes for the two-candidate elections 
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leave little room for debate. The candidates tend to converge 
together and to the generalized median, core, or equilibrium 
(depending upon how you derived the point). Clearly, for this class 
of institutions and situations, the principles which underlie the 
spatial models of candidate competition stemming from the work of 
Downs (1957) are correct. 
Again, generalization from personal observations leads to 
some interesting speculations. Candidates' behavior is very sensitive 
to the information they receive from the electorate. Candidates 
tend to change their position primarily in response to Gallup polls 
which show they are behind. They gather information about preferences 
on issues from every opinion poll available bµt tend not to act on 
the information unless they are behind as revealed in the Gallup 
poll. 
In eight of the experiments in which proper records exist 
on the details of candidate movement, candidates made a total of 
fifty-eight moves. Of these, forty moves or 69 percent of the total 
were made by the candidate who was losing in the previous Gallup poll. 
(The null hypothesis that movement by winners and losers is equally 
likely can be rejected at the . 01 level of significance. ) When forced 
to move, they then seem to follow a type of gradient procedure whereby 
they simply go in the direction which would yield the most votes. 
The distance candidates move tends to be much greater than 
the steps taken in large committees. This suggests that the information 
revealed by the polling techniques in this experiment does not allow 
the candidates to adjust themselves as finely to individual preferences 
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Committees 
Exp. No. of Final Exp. 
No. Subjects Choice No. 
101 35 (40, 70) 203 
102 35 (37 ,67) 204 
103 23 (35, 70) 205 
104 27 (35,70) 206 
106 35 (40,70) 207 
107 45 (36,71) 208 
108 23 (40,70) 209 
109 35 (40, 70) 210 
110 31 (40,70) 211 
111 33 (40,70) 212 
·---
TABLE 2 
INDIVIDUAL EXPERIMENT DATA 
Two-Candidate Elections 
No. of 
Subj ects Candidate Final 
(excl. Points Votes Exp. 
cand.) s T s T No. 
23 (38, 72) (�O, 70) 12 13 301 
41 (45,60) (�O, 70) 9 33 302 
33 (!+0,63) (40,70) 16 19 303 
19 (45, 75) (40,70) 8 13 304 
23 (35, 75) (36,76) 10 15 305 
19 (JS, 70) (42,65) 15 6 306 
19 (50 ,60) (40, 70) 9 12 307 
27 (37,73) (36. 72) 15 14 *308 
35 (40,70) (35' 70) 15 14 309 
41 (39,70) (40,70) 18 23 310 
311 
Three-Candidate Elections - -
No. of i�'" Subjects Candidate Final (excl. Points cand. 2 I s T u S T R -u-
22 (21.,1.Q) (36,70) (34,70) 10 7 8 
22 (21 ,65) (75 ,75) (60,40) 12 8 5 
28 (40,69) (�_Q_i_Z9._) (41,69) 8 lJ 10 
22 (40,70) (35' 70) C45, 10) 13 5 7 
30 (38,70) (40,70 ) (45..:12_) 12 7 13 
26 (40,70 )  (40,71) (i_l, 68) 8 8 13 
48 (42,72) (45 ,70 ) (42,72) 5 18 27 
28 (35,70) (55,65) (45,60) 15 10 5 
24 (30 ,75) 02....lQ) (60,65) 2 12 11 
24 (31,75) (40,70) (35, 75) 10 13 4 
33 (60,80) (40,70) (35, 75) 12 3 18 
*Due to an administrative error charts were not distributed in accord with Table 1 . Tlie core of this game is 
(40,70) but no subject had a maximum at that point. The observation is eliminated from all calculations below. 
Outcome 
mean (38.3,69.8) 
(2. 92) 
(38.8,70.9) (39.2, 70.5) 
(3.08) (8.32) 
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as might otherwise be the case and that in situations where decision 
costs are low, direct democracy might adjust "more closely" to 
preferences than do competitive election processes. A reasonable 
conjecture is for example that, had the equilibrium not been in 
multiples of five or ten, say at (36,73), the elections would have 
still gone to (40,70) while the direct democracy would have gone to 
(36,73). Of course, if the process is costly in terms of polls or 
in terms of a personal cost to those who propose amendments, the 
comparative performance might be very different indeed. 
The fact that candidates in these processes have no personal 
preferences over issues leads to another interesting variable. If, 
for example, a candidate has his/her own independent preferences over 
issues, (s)he may be willing to risk losing the election for the 
additional reward he would gain if when elected (s)he is able to 
implement decisions that are to his/her personal liking. If candidates 
are allowed to have preferences in addition to winning, then the system 
may behave differently and be sensitive to the process of candidate 
selection. 
Other institutions such as polling techniques appear to be 
exceptionally important. In these experiments, candidates basically 
asked "how many would prefer me to move to ?" although other 
questions were asked whenever candidates could find a way to articulate 
them (e.g. , "How many are to the right of fifty on the x?" "How many 
want me to move up?" "How many would vote for me if I moved to 
Preliminary experiments suggested that the system would not generally 
converge if candidates were not allowed to take opinion polls. That 
? " ) • 
17 
is, if the candidate knows only whether he is ahead or behind and has 
no other information about where people's preferences lie, then the 
system may exhibit different behavior. Thus the results reported here 
are likely to be sensitive to institutional perturbations. 
Outcomes of the three-candidate election are graphed on 
figure 5. Because of the lack of theory, generalizations are difficult 
to make. The pattern indicates that on average the process will result 
in the median but the variance is large. The following theory based 
on the dynamics of the behavior emerges. Candidate competition drives 
all candidates to the median. Once there, however, the "middleman" 
is squeezed out by the candidates on both sides of him. If the election 
is held when candidates are in this configuration, one of the "outliers" 
will win. If candidates still have the opportunity to change positions, 
the "middleman" will move away from the equilibrium, thereby initiating 
a new cycle converging toward the equilibrium. The distribution of 
outcomes seems to depend critically upon the timing of the election 
since that will determine the phase of the cycle on which the experiment 
is terminated. 
There are observations, however, which cast doubts on 
this theory. Notice the position of candidates on table 2 for 
experiment number 304. Candidate S at (40,70) is boxed in on both 
sides by T on his left at (35,70) and U on his right at (45,70). 
If individuals had voted sincerely for the candidate whose 
position would yield the most money, the vote would have been five 
for S, ten for T, and ten for U. Candidate S won because he got 
five votes which T would have gotten by sincere voting and three 
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FIGURE 5: Three-Candidate Elections Outcome Distribution 
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votes which U would have gotten, thereby bringing his vote to 
thirteen. Connnents volunteered by subjects afterward supported 
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the hypothesis that voters were consciously using strategic voting 
strategies. Some voters who pref erred an outlying candidate decided 
to vote for the person in the center because their favorite candidate 
had not been doing well at the polls and the voters did not want to 
"waste" the vote. They therefore shifted support to the median. If 
such strategic voting is generally characteristic of three-candidate 
processes, the instability discussed above should not occur. Here 
we definitely need more theory and that theory should incorporate 
the probability of winning as perceived by the voter. 
SECTION FOUR: THE DECISION TO VOTE 
For some of the two-candidate elections the experimental 
design had a feature not revealed in the instructions. After individuals 
had marked their ballots indicating for whom they were planning to vote, 
they were told there would be a poll tax. If an individual wanted 
his/her vote counted, a poll tax of $. 50 would be deducted from earnings. 
Subjects were assured that they would be paid according to the position 
of the winning candidate independent of the decision to vote. The 
decision not to vote could only affect an individual's payment by 
influencing the outcome of the election. Those who wanted their vote 
counted and were willing to pay the $. 50 were asked to place an X on 
their ballots. Actually the poll tax was not collected and all 
individuals' votes were counted in determining the winner .4 
Figure 6 contains the frequency of decisions to vote as 
a function of the monetary difference between the two candidates as 
seen from the subjects' point of view. While the observations are 
not as numerous as we would like, a pattern is definitely beginning 
to emerge. The relative frequency of voting clearly increases as 
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the difference between the candidates increases. This can be seen 
impressionistically from the figure and from the logit model estimated 
and plotted in the figure against the data. 
Of particular interest is the high frequency of voting which 
occurs when the difference between the candidates is less than $. 50, 
the cost of voting. Sixty-three percent of these subjects for whom 
the difference between the candidates was $. 50 or less paid $. 50 to 
vote. These people voted even though the cost of voting exceeded or 
equaled the maximum possible monetary return from voting. Whether or 
not this behavior is a result of a feeling of "duty" has yet to be 
determined, but the data are very supportive of a model such as the 
one found in Riker and Ordeshook (1973). 
SECTION FIVE: CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The conclusions are easy to sunnnarize. For the political 
situations studied here in which the citizens had well-formed preferences 
over an issue space characterized by certainty, and where there were 
no premeeting meetings, there was very little difference between the 
behavior of large connnittees and two-candidate elector al behavior. 
They all resulted at the core or equilibrium. The spatial models in 
these settings are very accurate predictors of policy. Three-candidate 
processes can produce different process behavior. The median of 
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individual preferences will emerge on average as the group choice 
but the variance is larger than for the other two processes. Thus 
in the three-candidate processes individuals who are "far" from the 
center are more likely to get favorable policies than is the case 
with two-candidate elections. 
A satisfactory explanation of these results is not available. 
The exact process of convergence is possibly sensitive to the nature 
of the polling institutions and practices which provide candidates with 
feedback on their strategies. Candidate decisions are clearly influenced 
by the state of their current information. Research should not focus 
on the dynamic properties of candidate decisions alone, however, as 
is the natural tendency in game theoretic models. Voting patterns in 
three-candidate elections and in response to voting costs suggests 
there is much which remains to be explained even within political 
settings as simple as these. 
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INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMMITTEES 
General 
You are about to participate in a committee process experiment 
in which one of numerous competing alternatives will be chosen by 
majority rule. The purpose of the experiment is to gain insight into 
certain features of complex political processes. The instructions are 
simple. If you follow them carefully and make good decisions, you might 
earn a considerable amount of money. You will be paid in cash. 
Instructions to Committee Members 
The alternatives are represented by points on the blackboard. 
The committee will adopt as the committee decision one and only one 
point. Your compensation depends on the particular point chosen by 
the committee (see attached payoff chart). For example, suppose your 
payoff chart is that given in Figure 1 and that the committee' s  final 
choice of alternative is the point (x, y) = (170, 50). 
y 
x 
Figure 1 
Your compensation in this even t would be $7, 000. I f  the po licy o f  the 
committee is (140,125) your comp ens ation would be computed as follows : 
The point (140, 125) is half-way b e tween the curve marked 
$7, 000 and the curve marked $8, 000. So, your compensation is half-way 
b e tween $7, 000 and $8, 000, i. e .  $7, 500. I f  the policy is one-quarter 
o f  the dis t ance b e tween two curves, then your pay o f f  is determined
by the same proportion (i. e. at (75, 50) which is one-quar ter o f  the 
way b e tween $8,000 and $9, 000, you get $8, 250) . 
The comp e tition char ts  may dif fer among individuals. This 
means that the patt erns of preferences dif fer and the monetary amounts 
may not b e  comparab le. The point which would result in the highest  
payo f f  to you may not result  in the highest payo ff  to s omeone else . 
You should decide what de cision you want the committee to make and do 
whatever you wis h  within the confines of the rules to get things to go 
your way. The exp erimenters, however, are no t p rimarily concerned 
with whether or how you par ticipate s o  long as you st ay within the 
con fines of the rules. Under no circums tances may you mention anything 
quantitative about your competition. You are free, if you wish, to 
indicate which ones you like b e s t, e t c., but you canno t mention 
anything about the a ctual monetary amounts. Under no circums tances 
may you mention any thing about ac tivities which might invo lve you and 
o ther committee memb ers after the experiment (i. e .  no deals to sp lit
up a f terward or no physical threat s) . 
Parliamentary Rules 
The process begins with an exis ting mo tion (200, 150) on the 
floor. You are free to prop o s e  amendments to this mo tion . Supp o s e, 
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for example, (170, 50) is the motion on the floor and you want the group 
to consider the point (140, 125) . Simply raise your hands and when you 
are reco gnized by the chair, say " I move to amend the motion to (140, 
125) . "  The group will then proceed to vote on the amendment . If the 
amendment passes by a maj ority vo te, the point (140,125) is the new 
mo tion on the floor and is s ubj e ct, itself, to amendmen t s . If the 
amendment fails the mo tion (170, 50) remains on the floor  and is s ubj ect 
to further amendment. Thus, amendment s  simply change the mo tion on 
the floor. You may pass as many amendment s as you wish .  
A t  any time during the consideration of an amendment o r  the 
mo tion on the floor a mo tion t o  end debate is in order . I f  there are 
no obj ections, an immediate vote wil l  take place . If there are 
obj e c tions, the mo tion to end debate will itself b e  put to a maj o rity 
vote. I f  the mo tion to end debate fails, the amendment process  
continues . If it pass es, a vo te  on the amendment or mo tion will take 
place . 
To sum up, the exis tin g  mo tion on the floor is (200, 150) . 
You are free to amend this mo tion as you wish. The meeting will no t 
end until a maj ority consent s to end debate and accep t  some mo tion . 
Your compensation will be determined by the mo tion on the floor 
final ly adop ted by the maj o rity. 
Are there any ques tions? 
We would like you to answer the ques tions on the attached 
p age. These should help you understand the ins truc tions. 
25 
26 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR TWO-CANDIDATE ELECTIONS 
General 
You are about to par t i c ipate in an electoral proces s 
exper iment in which one o f  two candidates (S or T) will b e  elected . 
The purp o s e  of the experiment is to gain ins ight into cer tain features 
of comp l ex political proces ses. The ins truc t ions are s imp le. I f  
y o u  follow them care fully and make g o o d  d e c i s ions, y o u  might earn a 
cons iderab le amo unt o f  money. You will be paid in cash . 
Ins truc t ions to Voters  
Your task is to elect either candidate S o r  candidate T .  
The task o f  the elected individual i s  t o  choo se one o f  several 
comp e t ing alterna t ives, represented by points on the b lackboard. 
Af ter  the elect ion he/ she will choos e  one and only one point . Your 
pay o f f  depends on the part icular po int cho sen by the elected 
individual (see at tached payment chart) . For examp le, s uppose  your 
payment chart is  that given in f igure 1, and that the elected 
individual's cho ice is the point (x,y) = (170,50). 
/SD 
/W 
/JO 
120 
110 
/00 
90 
fO 
70 
30 
io 
10 
0 
y 
x 
Figure 1 
Your payment as read from figure 1 would be $7,000. 
For p o ints whi ch lie b e tween curves, the chart should b e  
read i n  t h e  following manner. Suppo se  t h e  e l e c t e d  individual choo ses 
the p o int (140,125). This po int, (140,125), is hal f-way b e tween the 
curve marked $7,000 and the curve marked $8,000. So your payment 
is hal f-way b e tween $7,000 and $8,000, i . e .  $7,500. If the po int is 
one-quar ter o f  the dis tance be tween two curves, then your payment 
is det ermined by the same propor t ion . As an examp le (75,50) lies 
one-fourth o f  the way between the curve marked $8,000 and the curve 
marked $9,000, s o  you get $8,250. 
The payment charts may d i f f e r  among individuals .  This 
means that the pat t erns o f  pref erences d i f fer and the monetary-­
amo unts may no t be comparable. The p o int which would result in the 
highest payment to you may no t result in the highe s t  payment to 
s omeone else. You should dec ide what f inal decis ion you want and 
do whatever you wish within the confines o f  the rules to get things 
to go your way. The experiment ers, however, are no t primarily 
concerned with whether or how you par t i c ipate so long as you s tay 
within the conf ines o f  the rules. Under no c ircumstances may 
you ment ion anything quantitative about your payment . You are free 
if  you wish, to indicate which point you like b e s t, the ones you 
l ike l eas t, the direct ion of your preference, e t c . but you canno t 
men t ion anything about the actual monetary amount s .  Under no 
c ircumstances may you ment ion anything about a c t ivities whi ch might 
involve you and o the r committee members after the experiment (i . e  
no deals t o  split up aft erward o r  no phys ical threats). 
From t ime to t ime you will be asked to par t i c ipat e  in 
opinion polls by a show of hands. You are free to answer in any 
manner you l ike . P l ease record the appropriate data on the vo ter 
record sheet . 
Ins tructions to Candidates 
If you win the e:Lect ion, you will be paid.$ jQ. 00 I f  
y o u  lose, you w i l l  receive �1.00 Do no t men t ion the amount o f  
this paymen t and d o  no t as sume the payment t o  the o ther cand idate 
is the same . Please do not talk to anyone aside from what is 
neces sary to conduc t polls  and indicate your tentat ive po int choices. 
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Election Organizati.on_ 
The election will be heid minutes after the --------
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instructions are cOinpleted. At the end of this period each candidate 
will choose a fiaal point on the blackboard, The election will be held. 
Ycur payment will be determined. by the fi.!lal point chosen by the ca:1didale 
who receives a majority vote. 
Each canciidate must m2.intain a tentative point choice durii".g 
the election period. Both candidates will begin at the point (200, 150). 
A candidate is free to change this tentative choice at any time during 
the election period and as many times as he/ she wishr .. >. 
Two types of polls will be conducted - - opinion polls and 
Gallup polls. Candidates will have the opportunity to ask "Would you 
prefer me to move to the point ( ) ? " The opportunity to 
conduct such opinion polls will oc cur in turn with the first decided by lot. 
Every minutes a Gallup poll will be conducted. The 
experimenter will ask, "If the election were held now, would you vote 
for Sor T? 11 The results of all polls will be made public. 
At the end of the election period each candidate must submit 
a final point. He will submit it in writing prior to learning about his 
opponent's choice. The candidates will then announce their final 
points and the election will be held. 
The candidate who receives � majority vote wins the -�i.ectbn. 
Voters 1 payrnents are datermined by the final point chosen by the winning 
candidate. Are the<e any questions? 
Prior to beginning, we would like all voters to answer the 
questions on the attached voter test sheet (p. 7 ). 
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VOTER BALLOT 
Voter No. 
I wish to vote for candidate -----------------
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INSTRUCTIONS FOR THREE-CANDIDATE ELECTIONS 
General 
You are about to participate in an electoral process experi­
ment in which one of three candidates (S, T, or U) will be elected. The 
purpose of the experiment is to gain insight into certain features of 
complex political processes. The instructions are simple, If you 
follow them carefully and make good decisions, you might earn 3. 
considerable amount of money. You will be paid in cash. 
Instructions to Voters 
Your task is to elect one of candidate S, candidat e  T ,  o r  cand idate u. 
The task of the elected individual is to choose one of several competing 
alternatives, represented by points on the blackboard. After the 
election he/ she will choose one and only one point. Your payoff 
depends on the particular point chosen by the elected individual (sec 
attached payment chart). For example, suppose your payment chart 
is that given in figure 1, and that the elected individual's choice is 
the point (x, y) = (170, 50). 
/SO..,__,_..,....,....,_,_.,,,...-.--....,...._=r-r-r-r-i-r-T"T-rr-r-T"1'....-r!T1�:r-t"TirrT1 
/'ID 
l.i/O 
no 
/10 
}'!> 
'iO 
70 
(;0 
50 .l,..;_\._;__j__""-..;_.;.-1-��---+-++-1-+--.-+-+-H-+-i-'---
�" 
30 
20 
/() 
() 
Figure 1 
x 
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Your payment as read from figure 1 would be $7, 000. 
For points which lie between curves, the chart should be read 
in the foll owing m anner. Su ppose the elected individual chooses the 
point (140, 125). Th is point, (140, 125), is half way between the curve 
marked $7, 000 and the curve marked $8, 000. So your payment is 
half way between $7 , 000 and $8, 000, i.e. $7, 500. If the point is 
one quarter of the distance between two curves, then your payment 
is determined by the same proportion. As an example (75, 50) lies 
one-fourth of the way between the curve marked $8, 00 0 and the curve 
marked $9, 000, so you get $8, 250. 
The payment charts may differ among individuals. This 
means that the patterns of preferences differ and the monetary amounts 
may not be comparable. The point which would result in the highest 
payment to you may not result in the highest payment to someone else. 
You should decide what final decision you want and do whatever you wish 
within the confines of the rules to get things to go your way. The experi­
menters, however, are not primarily concerned with whether or how 
you participate so long as you stay within the confines of the rules. 
Under no circumstances may you mention anything quantitative about 
your payment. You are free, if you wish, to indicate which point 
you like best, the ones you like least, the direction of your preference, 
etc. but you cannot mention anything about the actual monetary amounts. 
Under no circumstances may you mention anything about activities which 
might involve you and other committee members after the experiment 
(i.e., no deals to split up afterward or no physical threats). 
From time to time you will be asked to participate in opinion 
polls by a show of hands. You are free to answer in any manner you 
like. Please record the appropriate data on the voter record sheet. 
Instructions to Candidates 
If you win the election, you will be paid ft JO, OQ. If you 
lose, you will receive 'fl, /, 00 . Do not mention the amount of this 
payment and do not assume the payment to the other candidates. are the 
same. Please do not talk to anyone aside from what is necessary to 
conduct polls and indicate your tentative point choices, 
Election Organization 
The election will be held minutes after the 
instructions are completed. At the end of this period each candidate 
3 2  
will choose a final point o n  the blackboard. The election will be held. 
Your payment will be determined by the final point chosen by the candidate 
who receives a majority vote. 
Each candidate must maintain a tentative point choice during 
the election period. All candidates will begin at the point (200, 150), 
A candidate is free to change this tentative choice at any time during 
the election period and as many times as he/ she wishes. 
Two types of polls will be conducted - - opinion polls and 
Gallup polls. Candidates will have the opportunity to ask "Would you 
prefer me to move to the point ( ) ? 11 The opportunity to 
conduct such opinion polls will occur in turn with the first decided by lot. 
Every minutes a Gallup poll will be conducted, The 
experimenter will ask, "If the election were held now, would you vote 
for S,T, orU'?"The results of all polls will be made public. 
At the end of the election period each candidate must submit 
a final point. He will submit it in writing prior to learning about his 
opponents' choices. The candidates will then announce their final 
points and the election will. be held. 
The candidate who receives the large s t  number o f  votes  wins 
the elec t ion. Vo ters' payments are d etermined by the f inal po int cho s en 
by the winning candidate. Are there any que s t ions? 
Prior to beginning, we would like all voters to answer the 
questions on the attached voter test sheet (p. 9 ) . 
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VOTER BALLOT 
Vo t er No. 
I wish to vo t e  for cand idate ������������������� 
�entative 
Candidate/Poll noint 
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Voter No. _________ _ 
VOTER RECORI;><-.,SHu-=E,_.E,_,T,__ __ ______ ____ _ 
Proposed 
no int 
My 
Vote 
·1·entahve 
Candidate/Poll .. point _ 
.t'roposea My pqint_ . Vote 
------1-- -1------1----11 ----1 ----- ------ ---
------l-----1 ----jf----11 ----- 1 ----+--- --i------
-------- -1--------l----U------4------4------ >---------
-------1 ---+------+----�l- ---+-------t--,-'--·--- -� 
1. 
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Voter Numbe• 
VOTER 'EEST OT!:SS'YIONS 
If the final platform of the winning candidate is (90, 1 _0_5_,_l __ 
my payment wc·_1ld be j__  
2. The point where I receive the most money is _ _,__�---''--
which yields a payment of .:i:S:.__ _____ _ 
3. Suppose the final point choice S is (50, 55) and .the final point 
choice of Tis (85, 60), then the election of candidate -------
would yield me the most money. The amount would be $ ___ _ 
9£ 
.l-'-...:..-i.;_c__'._J_c--'-l-'---'-1--'-'--l-'---'--l-__;._.---1----'-+.--I O'f: 
or 
Oji. 
OS 
OU 
1. 
Voter Number _______ _ 
VOTER TEST OUESTIONS 
If the final platform of the winning candidate is (90, 105) 
my payment would be ...::$<-------
2. The point where I receive the most money is_.____._�'---
which yields a payment of .::i;_ ______ _ 
3. Suppose the final point choice S is ( SO, SS) , the final point 
choice of T is (8S, 60), and the final choice of U is (120, 110); 
then the election of candidate would yield me the 
most money. The amount would be $ ____ _ 
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FOOTNOTES 
* The f inanc ial support  o f  the Na t ional Sc ience Foundation and 
the Cal tech Program for Ent erpr ise  and Publ ic Pol icy is gratefully
acknowl edged . The Gugg enheim Founda t ion and the Center for
Advanc ed S tudy in the Behavio ral S c i ences also provided t ime
and the research as s is tanc e of Lynn Gale and Ron Rice. 
1 .  F o r  a d iscu s s ion of this see Fior ina and Plo t t  (1978). 
2. The null hypo thesis  that the out come is the mean of the ind ividual
maximums or tha t the out comes are unifo rmly d i s t r ibut ed over the
range of pref erences can eas ily be r ej ec t ed in favor of the
al terna t ive that the out come is the co r e / e qu il ibr ium . In fac t ,
the null hypothesis that the outcomes a r e  the core/ equil ibr ium 
canno t be r ej ected at a 10 percent l evel o f  conf idenc e. 
The Ho tell ing T2 t e s t s  are as  follows : 
-
(40, 70) T
2 F µ - p df 
Committ ees (-1. 7 ,- . 2) 5. 8 295 2 . 5909 . 136 ( 2 , 8) 
2 cand ida te (-1. 2, . 9) 3 .  7303 1. 6579 . 250 ( 2 , 8) 
3 cand idate (- . 8 ,. 5) . 6640 . 2951 . 752 ( 2 , 8) 
3 .  A Box t e s t  for equal ity o f  var iance-covar iance yiel d s  the following 
r esul t s. 
df 
Commi ttees vs 2 cand idates 3 
Commi tt ees vs 3 candidates 3 
2 cand idates vs 3 candidates  3 
2 
x 
5 . 3705 
1 6 . 9675 
17 . 737 
p 
. 15 
p < . 001 
p < . 001 
4 .  Prio r  to the v o t e  count, subj e c t s  wer e told that we need ed tho s e  
data r esul t ing from their d ec i s ion, and i n  f a c t  there would b e  
n o  tax .  Subj ects  then vo t ed and t h e  winner was d e termined. 
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